Free or determined
I argue that it is impossible to rightly interpret whether we are free or determined. I contend that upon close inspection of the best arguments of determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism there is simply no valid assertion to fully discredit any view. Moreover, there is neither a satisfactory conclusion that can rationally allow for one to confidently assert that one view prevails over the other. It is critical to understand my position by distinguishing the interpretation of the experience of choice from the experience itself as clarified by Hasker.1 It is also necessary to clarify that my position is not a synthesizing of all views neither is it a rejection of all validity.
The importance of this position of uncertainty is that the search for right interpretation of human behavior and thus practical outcomes that these existential answers can produce may misguide the interpreter into offering and/or embracing a fictitious certainty that simply cannot be unequivocally ascertained. It seems to me that most of the content offered in this debate is in defending one position over the other. Thus, I humbly submit that the approach to dealing with this question by seeking to prove determinism, libertarianism, or compatibilism is irrational. Attempting to interpret a multi-dimensional, transcendent reality through the limitations of a linear, time-constrained reality is, at best, an enjoyable diversion for an aficionado of unsearchable things. This is not an effort to end the discussion, but simply to put it in right perspective that nobody has the capacity to fully and rightly understand whether one is determined or free.
If it were possible to assert a single view without a major flaw in the argument, then this debate would be as non-existent as the consensus is on this discussion. In many ways, I am stating the obvious parameters that have been produced by the best thinkers in philosophy. The main point is this: each position makes a good case while failing to remain sound. Determinism seems to have had the most objection due to its logical conclusion that strips not only freedom of choice, which is highly esteemed, but moral responsibility, which is essential for a stable society. Despite impressive support for determinism, there is a theological dissonance created by this understanding, which Peterson highlights in the following paragraph,
If in everything we do we are merely “following the script” set out in divine decrees. Are we not, in fact, in the role of puppets being manipulated by a poet master? Can there really be meaningful personal relationships between humans and God, when one party in the relationship exercises complete, unilateral control over the other? How can God place any real value on the love that humans express towards the divine, when that love is simply the inescapable result of God’s decree that those humans shall do so?2
Moreover, the problem of evil further discredits this position when Peterson questions determinism in the following way, “How can God both be completely satisfied that things are going exactly as God wishes, and also angry and disappointed at some of the very events planned and set in motion?”3 Thus, determinism is majestically compelling when God’s sovereignty and limitlessness is in view, yet at the same time disgustingly offensive and unjust that both good and evil would be introduced, executed, and punished/rewarded by a sovereign puppet master.
Libertarianism is simply presumptuous to think that one is independent of influence in such an enormous cosmos. This view, open theism, and Molonism is very comfortable for thinkers of this generation, but it simply is not free from heavy blows to their argument. Even when considering the doctrine of divine timelessness, libertarians risk incoherence and self-contradiction.4 I will ignore the compatibilist argument simply be- cause it falls apart once one thinks beyond immediate situations.
It is clear that my position, by definition, is inviting criticism from all other positions. The determinist would accuse of ignoring compelling evidence of a transcendence that is powerful enough to orchestrate all things. The libertarian would label my position as logically inconsistent when allowing for a synthesizing of incompatible ideas. The Compatibilists would label my argument as passive and escapist, valuing their view but failing to embrace it. All of them could object by saying that my view is worthless in that it provides no answers. My response to these objections is both frustrating and deflating because there are no answers to be had. The point is that one cannot know and thus cannot attain the conclusive answers we seek regarding the interpretation of how one chooses. This is not to say that one cannot gain right understanding in the pursuit of these answers, but simply that one cannot gain complete right understanding about the issues.
I conclude that it is impossible to rightly and fully interpret the experiences of choice by defending a single position. One can question, ponder, meditate, and conclude a certain position, but never succeed in attaining a sound explanation. I liken this pursuit to an ignorant fly that continuously and almost forcibly lands on a fruit bowl seeking not just a form of sustenance but also to understand the origin, factual nutritional quality, and the reason that each fruit has distinct textures, flavors, and colors, etc. To keep this fly from landing on this fruit would strip it of being a fly, but to assume that the fly is capable of understanding things that even we intelligent human beings would struggle to discover is ludicrous and naive. One must acknowledge that there is a tran- scendence of which we are incapable of acquiring as we choose what we are predisposed to freely choose: wonder.
1 Hasker, William. 1983. Metaphysics: Constructing a World View. Contours Of Christian Philos- ophy. Downers Grove, IL, U.S.A.: InterVarsity Press. 37.
2 Peterson, Michael L. 2013. Reason And Religious Belief: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press. 162.
3 ibid. 163.
4 William Hasker Metaphysics 53-55.
