On miracles
I determine that David Hume’s objection to miracles is unsuccessful in calling all stories of miracles to question. I argue that his reasoning is incoherent and itself an unreliable approach. I will proceed to defend my view within the context of Hume’s definition for the word miracle and in consideration of the framework of his final argument which İbrahim Sezgül summarizes in the following way:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature.
Firm and unalterable experience has established these laws.
A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.
Therefore, "the proof against miracles . . . is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.[1]
The importance of my position is in exposing Hume’s shortsightedness and seeming subjectivity of each of his main arguments against miracles. His main objections are as follows: witnesses are not reliable, humans are gullible, educated people are seldom convinced, the counterevidence is always stronger, and miraculous reports used to support religious belief is even more dubious.[2]I contend that Hume fails to observe the byproduct of miracles in his criticism. My position argues that his objections do not hold true and thus are an unreasonable criticism regarding the issue of miracles.
I would like to defend my position by sharing four distinct personal miracle stories. Though I believe all to be true and factual, I will expose the possibility of Hume being accurate in his arguments and proceed from there. My premise is that God indeed sees us, hears our prayer, and often times acts against the natural process as determined by most.
When I was nine I had bruises on the soles of my feet so painful that I could not walk for several days. I remember that at the peak of my pain, after the Sunday evening service at my church, two women came to our house to share in a meal and claimed to have faith that God would heal me. They proceeded to pray and my feet were instantly healed! Hume would argue that a nine year old boy is not a reliable witness, that in retelling this story as a 30 year old man, that I am simply, either intentionally or unintentionally, skewing the facts. I argue that though there is possibility of unreliable witnesses, it is irrational to state that every witness of miracles is unreliable. I also hold that in my situation, I was not alone in witnessing the experience. Of course Hume would say that those who were there would seek to skew the facts to support their religious belief.
Second Story: I was eighteen and was experiencing powerful ocular migraine headache. The pain was unbearable and my sight was so profoundly impaired so I asked a group of friends to pray for me so I could drive home and suddenly I could see clearly with no headache! Either I was trying to deceive everyone or something really did happen. Let’s assume that I was speaking the truth, Hume would seek to find an explanation within the bounds of natural law and state, for example, that it was coincidence that the migraine naturally lifted at the same time that we prayed. Here I would object by saying that this would be a statistical miracle for such a coincidence. Also, he could seek to expand our laws to accommodate this occurrence as Alastair McKinnon suggests and argue that the power of suggestion was activated and thus produced a natural way to overcome this headache.[3]To this I would easily argue that I have had similar pain at other times with no change in condition.
Third Story: I was twenty-six when I had a dream where God was directing me to a specific assignement. I told my wife and she prayed a prayer of faith asking for clear confirmation that this was a miraculous dream by which God was directing us. She asked for a check with a specific dollar amount to arrive in our mailbox within two weeks. We kept this to ourselves and a week and a half later we received a check with that specific amount by a woman claiming to have been directed by God to send us that amount immediately! It was inarguable that God was invading my dreams and uncontestable that this woman was convinced that God asked her to send us this large gift.
The compelling evidence is not so much in the actual miraculous events that occurred, but the radical response that those alleged events provoked. Just as the disciples faced perilous suffering, torture, and death in defense of their belief in the resurrected Christ, so too I am prepared to face the same if God would find it appropriate for me to face such affliction. Nobody in his or her right mind can willingly be self-gullible and willingly experience self-sacrifice. It is simply illogical to postulate the non-existence of miracles; Christianity hinges on the miracle of resurrection. This story of the miraculous resurrection of Christ has convinced many intelligent people throughout history. Thus, though it remains possible that testifiers are deceivers or are him/herself deceived, it does not strip miracles of their viability and existence. To argue that educated people would not be convinced by these occurrences is absurd. Perhaps he meant to say that the cynic is seldom convinced to which I would agree. Even if the cynic finds evidence that suggests that miracles are indeed true, he/she will work tirelessly to discredit it. It takes a high level of intellectual capacity to lay down pre-conceived notions of the non-existence of miracles and admit, as Anthony Flew did in 2004, that logical thinking will lead to the existence of God and thus his intervention.
A possible objection to my stance could be that I have failed to address the issue that if divine intervention indeed is possible, then why do such interventions not occur in other circumstances? I would respond by saying that, as some theists hold, “God justifiably does what God wants for reasons beyond human understanding.”[4]I realize that at the existential and emotional level, this is a difficult response to hear, but the problem of evil does not discredit the existence of God nor his intervention in the course of human events. The issue at hand is if God intervenes and ‘violates natural laws’ to which I answer that he can do and does whatever pleases him as the omnipotent one.
I conclude, therefore, that David Hume’s objection to miracles is not sound because it fails to explain the response of some of the testifiers. While it is true that it is possible that some may misrepresent the truth and at times willfully deceive rendering them unreliable, it cannot be representative of everyone who claims that miracles are true. The evidence stands against Hume thus requiring the wise to discredit his view.
[1]Sezgül, İbrahim. "The Concept of Miracle in Hume's Philosophy." Journal Of History, Culture & Art Research / Tarih Kültür Ve Sanat Arastirmalari Dergisi2, no. 4 (November 2013): 1-12. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost(accessed May 20, 2016). 5.
[2]Peterson, Michael L. 2013. Philosophy of Religion Selected Readings. Fifth Edition New York: Oxford University Press. 466-469.
[3]Peterson, Michael L. 2013. Reason And Religious Belief: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press. 210.
[4]Ibid., 224.
