Problem of evil
I contend that though the problem of evil (POE) presents a great challenge in believing in the Christian description of God, it does not undercut belief in theism. In danger of being immediately accused of possible contradiction, I want to clarify that the acknowledgement of the challenge that the POE presents is an olive branch of intellectual empathy and not an exposition of weakness. I stand firm that these challenges do not erode any intellectual right for a theist to continue in their belief in God. However, the POE provides inescapable data that aids in enhancing the theistic worldview.
The importance of this position is found in starting with the willingness to fundamentally embrace the existence of inexplicable things found in certain kinds of evil. As Peterson states, “a reasoned judgment must be made in light of all reasonable arguments.”[1]To ignore innocent suffering or dismiss it to the cliché verse in Romans 8:28 that all things work together for good for those who love God, is just without backbone. It is an existential question that needs to be dealt with. Too long have believers in the Christian God offered the overused and misused one-liner of, “God will not give you more than you can handle” during times of great pain. There is no pep talk to explain an eight year old being raped dozens of times a day or a struggling family of seven losing their father in a tornado. Thus a defense of theism in view of the POE must begin with embracing than an evil exists in the world that is hard to synthesize with the Christian description of God as all-powerful and perfectly good and loving.
It is clear to me that the existence of evil does not reduce the viability in the belief in the Christian God. I will begin this defense by asking the question as presented by Alvin Plantinga, “Could God have created a world containing moral good but no moral evil?[2]In answering this question, it is quickly exposed that there is no possibility for one to have the capacity to choose good without the ability to choose evil. There would otherwise be no distinction, people would simply be and not do anything with moral quality. To imagine a world of this sort is not possible because inherent to making morally good choices is the possibility of either making bad choices or simply not making good ones – what Plantinga calls transworld depravity. Thus, having moral good requires the possibility of moral evil.
At this point, the agnostic view may be able to harmonize an existence of a deistic God but will refuse to assert that theism can stand up to the test. Again, how can a good and perfect God allow for so much evil? One can easily imagine a distant and disengaged God who simply let the weeds grow as they wished and since God is not present, he is not responsible. However, it would be erroneous to dismiss theism at this juncture because omnipotence and goodness does not require unilateral control over moral outcomes of people’s choices. It could be said that it is more powerful for God to allow people to make their own choices and it still not derail his ultimate sovereignty, than to simply control all actions.
A possible objection could be that atheists continue to combat theists against the existence of God by arguing Mackie’s point that theism is a contradiction. This view argues that the only effective solution, as presented by Okello’s lecture, results in either a powerless God or an evil God. There is also the eastern paradigm that evil is an illusion and does not, in fact, exist. I would respond by saying the following things. The idea that God cannot eradicate evil ignores the possibility of God reserving the purging of all evil for a time when all his purposes will be made complete. In other words, inherent to theism is mystery and a transcendent storyline. I continue to affirm that moral good requires the possibility of moral evil. To assert that God is not good for allowing evil and thus reveals himself to be evil is inconsistent with the theistic principle of God’s merciful reach toward humanity. Central to theism is the idea of God seeking to redeem what was broken. If God truly sought to inflict evil on all creation, why is there so much good? Lastly, there is no logically consistent way to think away evil; it is real.
Another potential objection would be that my argument focuses only on moral evil and not on natural evil and thus fails to address the stiffer challenges against theism. To this I would respond that I admit that certain anomalies of evil are simply too difficult to explain. I am not sure how to argue a purpose for the suffering of innocent lives due to something not tied to moral evil. It is easy to see a ripple in the water and discover the original cause. Yet, natural disasters, disease, birth defects, and other impersonal forces cause so much harm and have no one to blame. Why do these happen? I’m not sure I know, but I do continue to hold that God is not evil. There is a collective groan among those who long for God to complete his plan and restore all things by purging evil once and for all. This is the climax of theism – there is an end to evil coming.
I conclude that the problem of evil does not present sufficient evidence against the existence of God. When imagining a world with no evil and only good, one arrives at the conclusion that there cannot be a moral good without the possibility of moral evil. Evil can exist and not strip God of his goodness or his power. Evil is real and not imagined. Thus, there is a transcendent knowledge as to why both moral and natural evil has governed so long while God’s nature is to purge evil. I admit that it is still hard to understand why certain bad things happen. However, they do not strip the theist of intellectual soundness, they only cause the theist to cling to the hope of the eschaton.
[1]Peterson, Michael L. 2013. Reason And Religious Belief: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press. 202.
[2]Peterson, Michael L. 2013. Philosophy of Religion Selected Readings. Fifth Edition New York: Oxford University Press. 162.
